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In this paper I review the US, UK and international literature on the responsiveness of 
housing supply to demand. This is a well developed area of the literature, but I put 
forward two new arguments: that developers face downward sloping demand curves 
in the housing market, and that housing developers as firms are sufficiently 
heterogenous that their output decisions cannot be generalised. I draw on the 
international literature but use the recent UK experience as a lens, arguing that the 
post Barker review planning policy and housing supply reforms did not yield as much 
additional housing supply as had been hoped and expected by policy markets and the 
housing development industry itself. After introducing two specific propositions, I 
present new statistical estimates that are at least highly suggestive that firm-specific 





It has long been recognised that the responsiveness of market-provided housing 
supply to changes in housing costs varies quite widely between countries. The 
relatively weak responsiveness of supply in the UK compared with the U.S. is 
probably the best documented example in the literature, but one recent study has 
found perhaps three groups of nations with similar degrees of supply responsiveness. 
The UK is an interesting case in that a concerted programme of planning policy and 
housing supply reform recently took place, granting an opportunity to examine the 
extent to which differences between the UK and other countries might be either 
structural, or the result of policy. 
 
In this paper I provide an historical narrative that is at least suggestive that outcomes 
in the housing development industry and, consequently, the housing market, did not 
match the expectations of those setting the UK housing policy agenda in the period 
2000-2010. I consider a set of casual, descriptive statistical evidence before 
introducing two propositions that might be important in developing our 
understanding of housing supply and affordability. One of these is essentially a new 
proposition – that developers face downward sloping demand curves in the housing 
market. The other is a development of ideas recently put forward by others – notably 
Ball et al (2010) – that the decisions of individual housing development companies 
may depend in part on firm-specific factors. In most studies of new housing supply 
hitherto, housing developers are implicitly assumed to be homogenous, each with 
identical behaviour in the housing and land markets. 
 
In the next section I briefly introduce the salient features of the British planning 
system insofar as it concerns the economics of residential development land supply. 
In sections 3 and 4 I review the literature to succinctly set out what we already know, 
from economic theory and related empirical evidence, about the responsiveness of 
new housing supply. I then develop my main arguments about the potential 
importance of understanding housing development as an industry, and housing 
developers as firms. Section 5 reviews aggregate, descriptive evidence on the effects 
of planning policy reform on housing supply in the UK. Section 6 presents a series of 
econometric results designed to illuminate the propositions that I have tried to 
develop in this paper and section 7, of course, discusses the findings and makes 
suggestions for continuing the development of a research agenda. 
 
2. The responsiveness of new supply to housing market pressure 
 
In the UK, the majority of new housing completions are provided by speculative 
housing developers, most of whom operate simultaneously in the housing and land 
markets. Developers enjoy an uneasy relationship with the planning system, relying 
on it to aid in the identification of land with development potential and, ultimately, 
provide the planning permissions necessary to pursue development. An important 
feature of the British planning system is its emphasis on flexibility rather than 
prescription. Development plans carry considerable weight, but are still essentially 
indicative rather than prescriptive: a developer submitting a planning application for 
land which is identified in a development plan as suitable for housing development 
cannot guarantee that permission will be obtained. This flexibility has been argued by 
some to create uncertainty, and to promote ‘rent seeking behaviour’, or the 
expenditure of resources by developers in the hope of realising betterment (a rise in 
land value associated with the grant of planning permission or development rights). A 
number of studies in the late 1980s through the mid 1990s explored the notion that 
the planning system, by restricting the supply of housing development land, was 
slowing down the rate of development and pushing up housing prices (see, inter alia, 
Bramley, 1993; Bramley and Watkins, 1996; Cheshire and Sheppard, 1989; Evans, 
1991, 1996). 
 
Although the origins of the system date to the 19th century, the modern planning 
system was essentially designed in the immediate post war period and introduced by 
the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act. Subject to adaptation and modification 
rather than full-scale replacement periodically in the 20th century, critics began to 
argue quite strongly by the late 1990s that the system was no longer coping well with 
the pressure for urban development (Cullingworth, 1997). However, although the UK 
economy had recovered from a recession in 1991, the mid-1990s were a period of 
weak housing market activity. It was not until a change of Government in 1997, with 
significant policy reform and independent status conferred on the UK’s central bank 
(the Bank of England) that economic and housing market activity began to accelerate. 
Thus, the very late 1990s and early 2000s were a period in which the planning system 
began to face fresh and much more significant challenges than hitherto. In a period 
of rising economic prosperity, falling real interest rates and population growth, the 
speculative housing development industry and its relationship with the planning 
system were about to become subject to great policy interest. 
 
In March 2003 the UK Government commissioned the now much-cited Barker Review 
of Housing Supply and Affordability. The Review triggered a period of intense debate 
concerning the relationships between the supply of housing and housing affordability 
on one hand, and between the planning system and the supply of new-build housing 
on the other. It also signalled the arrival of perhaps one of the most co-ordinated 
interplays between academic and policy research interests in the post-war period, at 
least within the fields of planning and housing economics. Almost immediately after 
the publication of the Barker (2004) report, the UK Government commissioned a 
series of research projects designed to lead to the creation of a set of ‘policy tools’ or 
simulation models drawing on formal econometric modelling of the housing system. 
The most prominent of these was a simulation model designed to give guidance 
about the likely future affordability of owner occupied housing based, in part, on 
projected rates of new-build housing completions (see Meen et al, 2005). In 2008, 
the Scottish Government added a similar simulation model to its suite of policy tools 
(see Leishman et al, 2008). Following a conceptual approach related to the Meen et 
al (2005) models, the Scottish model approach nevertheless reflected a number of 
important differences. In particular, the housing market was assumed to operate 
primarily at the sub-regional spatial level. By contrast, the initial estimations of the 
long-run model in England focused on the regional scale. 
 
It is not a particularly bold claim that the significance of new supply to house price 
change, levels and housing affordability was under estimated in the UK prior to the 
Barker Review. Most published studies of the national and regional UK housing 
markets concentrated on cycles in housing demand and house prices. Most 
conceptualised house price growth as a function of lagged house values, real house 
price levels and real household incomes. The appearance of lagged price growth in 
models is often justified on the basis that it captures a momentum effect while 
coefficients on real house price and household income levels capture the long-run 
relationship between prices and earnings, with periodic tendency for the market to 
correct over-shoots. Indeed, during the past two decades econometric models of the 
housing market have become increasingly sophisticated in their treatment of house 
price dynamics, including accounting for the role of expectations and the estimation 
of co-integration or error correction models in an attempt to capture long-run 
relationships (see, for example, Meen 1996, 1999, 2001; Meen et al 2005; Giussani 
and Hadjimatheou 1991; Muellbauer and Murphy 1997). 
 
The Barker Review helped to stimulate interest in the further development of 
housing market models. In particular, the Review emphasised the potential for the 
supply of housing to influence the affordability of housing in the long run, 
irrespective of apparently weak relationships in the short-run. The Barker report 
(2004) reflected growing policy concern that the stock of dwellings in England did not 
generate a supply of housing adequate to meet the demands of households, nor 
future demands implied by rates of household formation. The Review also focused in 
particular on empirical evidence that new-build supply does not appear to be 
responsive to changes in house prices, even in the long-run. The perceived knock-on 
impacts of these phenomena were described by Barker as high long run real house 
price growth, associated with deteriorating affordability. Other economic impacts 
include rising latent housing demand as well as restricted labour mobility, which itself 
is then associated with poor regional housing and labour market adjustment. The key 
recommendations of the Barker reports focused particularly on the planning system, 
acknowledging that land supply is the main constraint to increasing the supply of 
housing. Among other things, the review proposed regional affordability targets and 
called for a stronger evidence base to monitor the levels of construction output 
required to deliver improved affordability. 
 
3. What do economic theory and evidence tell us about housing supply 
responsiveness? 
 
The price elasticity of new housing supply, meaning the responsiveness of supply to a 
change in the price of housing, is relatively low in the UK compared with some other 
countries – particularly the U.S. Barker (2004) concludes that the price elasticity of 
new housing supply averages around 0.3 in the UK, though with regional variations. 
Pryce (2003) finds evidence that elasticities differ between periods of housing market 
growth and slump (0.58 and 1.03 respectively). This is suggestive that the 
development industry is slower to contract than to expand, but that the capacity to 
expand again is retained, at least to an extent, following a period of contraction. 
Malpezzi and Maclennan (2001) found, not only that UK elasticities are considerably 
lower than in the U.S., but that they were much lower, in both countries, post-war 
compared to the pre-war period (between 1.4 and 4.2 pre-war in the UK and 0.0 to 
0.5 post-war compared with 4.4 to 10.4 pre-war and 1.1 to 12.7 post-war in the U.S.). 
 
In fact, Caldera and Johansson (2013) describe the UK as belonging to a group of 
OECD countries that are characterised by low responsiveness of housing supply to 
housing market pressure. They found evidence to suggest that OECD countries 
belong to three groups characterised as ‘highly responsive’ (including the U.S., 
Canada, Sweden and Denmark), ‘responsive’ (New Zealand, Australia, Ireland, 
Norway and Spain) and ‘unresponsive’ (including the UK, Netherlands, Switzerland, 
Austria, Italy, Belgium, France). They go on to demonstrate some correlation 
(between -0.33 and -0.56) between population density / a regulation index, and 
supply responsiveness. Their regulation index is based on the number of days’ delay 
involved in obtaining a building permit or similar. 
 
Focusing more specifically on the UK, another strand of the literature deals with the 
possible impacts of the planning system on the supply of land suitable for housing 
development. It is probably fair to say that commentators are far further from 
agreement on this question than on the supply elasticity issue. However, it is not 
stretching the truth to state that there is acceptance that planning controls are at 
least part of the explanation for the lower price elasticity of supply in the UK 
compared, in particular, with the U.S. The scale of the effect is still subject to debate. 
Bramley (1993) argues that an increase in the supply of land with planning permission 
would primarily lead to an increase in housing construction, but with minimal impact 
on housing prices, a finding reiterated by Bramley and Watkins (1996) and Leishman 
& Bramley (2005). Cheshire & Sheppard (1989, 2004) suggest that the main impact of 
tight planning controls is on the density of housing development, although they also 
find evidence of a price effect. Evans (1991, 1996) argues that planning impacts most 
noticeably on housing quality and levels of consumption, rather than prices. 
 
These strands of the literature deal with the responsiveness of new-build supply and 
the possible influences of planning controls very much in an aggregate sense. Turning 
to a disaggregated (microeconomic) analysis has the potential to allow us to pose 
certain questions of policy as well as theoretical interest: how do housing developers 
respond to housing market conditions? How does the availability of land, materials 
and finance shape firms’ output levels and decisions on what to build and where? 
Some insights to these questions are already available from the literature. For 
example, there have been a number of studies of housing production, concerned 
mainly with the elasticity of substitution between land and non-land inputs to 
production (see, for example, Sirmans et al, 1979; Färe et al, 1981; McDonald, 1981). 
McDonald (1981) reviews a number of previous studies and shows that estimates of 
the elasticity of substitution (σ) vary considerably, but are generally less than one. 
Thorsnes (1997) points out that most previous studies use estimates of land value 
and that measurement error generally biases estimates of σ downwards. Using 
disaggregated data on 219 single development lots in Portland, he estimates σ using 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) and variable elasticity of substitution (VES) 
specifications and finds that the estimates are not significantly different from one. 
More recently, Epple et al (2010) demonstrate that it is possible to estimate the 
housing production function in the absence of separately observed housing and land 
price, assuming constant returns to scale and constant elasticity of substitution. 
 
Surprisingly, there are few equivalent published studies with a focus on the 
microeconomics of the housing development industry in the UK - most of the 
published work in this area has been focused on the U.S. One exception is a recent 
study published by Ball et al (2010) involving a test of whether supply elasticities vary 
between firms. This study used company level data derived from publicly quoted 
housebuilding companies in the UK. Although they examined whether interest rates 
or leverage ratios affected the supply elasticity of firms, they found that these 
variables were not statistically significant. Interestingly, they did report a substantial 
discontinuity between the performance of the top 11 firms and all other (smaller) 
firms in the industry. In particular, they noted that the largest firms seemed much 
better placed to take advantage of improved demand in the housing market 
upswing. It is also interesting to note that these results, based on econometric 
analysis, appear at face value to conflict findings by Adams et al (2009) who report 
based on qualitative data that larger housing developers have a preference for 
altering the pricing of a housing development in progress rather than altering 
planned output if the level of demand proves lower or higher than expected at the 
outset of development. Taken together, these studies seem to suggest that larger 
developers are better placed to react to changes in demand at the aggregate or 
company level, than in a local context or on a specific development site. 
 
It is also notable that few of the microeconomic studies referred to above have 
drawn on disaggregated data. Thorsnes (1997), Epple et al (2010) and Ball et al 
(2010) are recent exceptions. This paper is motivated as a contribution to a research 
agenda that reflects the heterogeneity of housing developers, land markets, housing 
markets, and the potential importance of sub-regional housing market context. The 
next section develops these ideas into more formal propositions before introducing 
a methodological approach and associated empirical work. 
 
4. Two microeconomic propositions relevant to new housing supply 
 
Housing developers are not homogenous firms as implicitly assumed in almost all 
macro, and some micro economic, studies. The behaviour of firms may vary for a 
number of reasons: 
 
First, firms’ land holdings differ (a well-documented reason for the high level of 
merger and takeover activity in the industry), so firms’ assessments of the cost of 
land relative to non-land inputs may vary. In other words, from the perspective of a 
developer the cost of land may extend beyond the simple financial cost – land cannot 
necessarily be purchased immediately even at the going market price, but acquisition 
is also a matter of timing and involves internal costs such as the maintenance of a 
professional team dedicated to identifying land with development potential, 
acquiring it and securing planning permission. Thus, a firm with an abundant supply 
of land may very well assess the cost of this production input differently compared to 
one struggling to acquire sufficient land with planning permission to maintain a 
planned level of output. 
 
Second, capital intensity may differ between, for example, firms with a greater focus 
on higher density development compared with those focusing on lower density, 
housing development. To put this another way, for a given production technology, 
different firms may have a lower / higher emphasis on labour or capital inputs 
depending on the type, style or scale of development favoured by the firm. 
 
Third, production technology may differ between firms, or firms may face more than 
one possible production function. For example, there may be a choice between off-
site and on-site fabrication. Alternatively, some firms might have particularly well 
developed, stable and highly skilled workers compared with market norms. 
 
Fourth, smaller firms may have more restricted access to capital, or more expensive 
lines of borrowing, than larger firms. Firms may also view the cost of capital 
differently depending on their balance between external borrowing and retained 
earnings as sources of investment capital. 
 
The four aspects of the heterogeneity of housing developers noted above are 
doubtless not exhaustive but are sufficient to allow me to introduce my first testable 
proposition: 
 
Housing developers are not homogenous, and their decisions on what and 
how much to build depends in part on their land holdings and costs of 
borrowing. 
 
I now turn to the demand side of the housing market, to develop a second 
proposition. Much is assumed about the determination of prices in the new-build 
sector of the owner occupied housing market, but there are good reasons for 
doubting elements of the received wisdom. In assuming that price levels prevailing in 
the existing housing stock automatically set prices for new-build housing, a great deal 
is presumed about the behaviour of consumers (house buyers) and firms (housing 
developers). To illustrate, let us first recognise that the demand and supply of new-
build housing is a small element of total demand and supply for owner occupied 
housing. New housing supply adds approximately 1% to the housing stock each year 
in the UK and, given that housing units transact on average once every 6-10 years, 
the implication is that new housing supply represents around 10% of total housing 
supply in a given year. 
 
Figure 1 represents the generally accepted view of the relationship between price 
determination in the second-hand and new-build sectors of the owner occupied 
housing market. In the left pane, the supply of existing housing interacts with 
demand to establish an equilibrium price level P1. At this point, we should recognise 
that the determination of supply from the existing housing stock is not 
straightforward, for a number of reasons. Although one element of supply is readily 
explainable with reference to household dissolution, another element is a 
consequence of change in housing demand. Existing owner occupier households 
deciding to ‘trade up’ will demand a larger / higher quality housing unit than the one 
they currently occupy; the latter is then offered for sale, i.e. enters supply. We can 
abstract housing demand more readily if we consider demand for and supply of 
housing services. In that case, a household trading up demands a higher quantity of 
housing services than the quantity that they offer for sale, hence we can consider net 
additional demand for housing services. One difficulty with this concept is that we 
traditionally think about the new-build sector as constructing and supplying new 
housing units, rather than quantities of housing services. Another issue is that recent 
work on modelling housing supply and affordability suggests that the ratio of 
households to housing units is an important driver of house price change in the long 
run. 
 
For the moment, let us assume that households do not trade up but that an increase 
in housing demand arises for demographic reasons. The demand curve shifts to DS1 in 
figure 1 and the price level rises to P2. The price levels P1 and P2 imply a horizontal 
demand curve faced by housing developers, shown on the right pane. This is 
consistent with the received view that developers are price takers and that their 
development decisions are therefore related to non-price factors including the level 
of construction costs, the cost of borrowing, the cost and availability of land, and the 
ease or difficulty in obtaining planning permission. A shift in the new-build supply 
curve might reflect change in the costs of construction or borrowing. This is shown as 
a movement from SN1 to SN2 in the right pane of figure 1. The price of new-build 
housing is unaffected, but the quantity constructed, supplied and traded rises from 
QN1 to QN2. There is no feedback loop to the equilibrium price of the housing stock. 
 
[Figure 1 goes here] 
 
The simple static analysis shown in figure 1 can say nothing about any dynamic 
relationships that may exist, for example, between new-build supply in the short run 
and price levels in the long run. This omission is at the heart of concerns raised during 
the Barker Review, and explored by a number of subsequent studies of housing 
prices and affordability. Meen (2005, 2008, 2011) formalises the dynamic relationship 
by recognising that supply is a derivation from the housing stock, and is influenced by 
‘pressure’ on that stock, represented as the ratio of owner occupier household to 
dwellings. Following Barker (2004) logic, persistently low levels of new housing 
completions allow a build-up of latent demand, manifest in a rising ratio of 
households to dwellings. Alternatively, we can say that the price elasticity of supply is 
a function of the adequacy of the housing stock to meet housing demand. In practical 
terms, we can predict that when household dissolutions lead to inheritance of 
housing units then these are less likely to be supplied to the market when the 
housing stock is under pressure than when it is not. Instead, such units may be 
consumed as second homes or offered to prospective renters. For the same reasons, 
a general increase in wealth has a similar outcome: relative scarcity and high levels of 
price appreciation encourage those trading up to withhold their previous housing 
unit from the market, and to consider it as a second home or privately rented 
investment instead. 
 
Are housing developers price takers? 
 
The tractability of the housing development industry as a policy tool that can be used 
to modify long-run housing outcomes depends on the relationship between new-
build and stock housing prices. If housing developers are price-takers, following price 
signals set in the second-hand housing market as shown in figure 1, then reduction or 
removal of supply-side constraints will lead to a rise in new housing completions 
provided that the development hurdle is reached (i.e. stock price levels exceed 
development costs). Indeed, this logic lies at the heart of UK government policy 
between the Barker Review and the change of government in 2010: regional housing 
targets were accompanied by pressures on local authorities to identify and release 
more land for housing development. At one stage in this period, the government 
gave consideration to the idea of ‘automating’ additional land release when housing 
market price signals suggested an inadequate supply of new housing (CLG, 2007). 
 
Despite significant government efforts to reduce supply-side constraints, by 2006 
there were emerging concerns that the response of the housebuilding industry, i.e. 
the additional provision of new housing completions, was falling short of government 
expectations. One possible explanation has been put forward by Levin and Pryce 
(2009) is that the steep fall in long term interest rates between 1996 and 2007 
“raised the prices of all high duration assets including building land.” They use this 
argument, together with the residual theory of land value, to explain why developers 
did not increase supply as much as might have been expected despite being faced 
with rapidly rising house prices. A simpler explanation, but along similar lines, is that 
lower levels of real interest rates effectively mean lower opportunity costs for 
holding land. However, as mentioned earlier, concerns about the muted response by 
the housing development industry to planning reform and a boost to the supply of 
land arose around the same time as two further studies of housing development 
were undertaken: the Callcutt Review (Callcutt, 2007), and a market study by the 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT, 2008). The latter concluded that there is little evidence to 
suggest that the market for newly constructed homes is not competitive and pointed 
out that, although the industry is dominated by a small number of large firms, the 
industry is characterised by takeovers and mergers. 
 
Callcutt (2007) reported improved levels of customer satisfaction compared to the 
earlier, much more negative, evidence reviewed by Barker (2004). Despite this, the 
main conclusions of Adams et al (2009), reporting on research funded by the UK 
government’s Department of Communities and Local Government, suggest a complex 
and subtle set of relationships between housing developers and land owners, and 
between the new-build and second-hand sectors of the housing market. They argue 
that, in a rising housing market and with intense competition for development land, 
developers are compelled to assume strong rates of house price appreciation in order 
to maximise the amount they bid for land. These assumptions then effectively tie 
developers to slow rates of delivery to ensure that housing prices rise sufficiently 
between land purchase and completion to allow profits to be made. 
 
Adams et al (2009) speculate that there are limits to the rate at which new housing 
completions can be absorbed into the housing stock. Based on detailed qualitative 
evidence, their suggestion is that housing developers do not compete with each 
other on price, but are careful to manage new-build supply in a local housing market 
to ensure that rates of purchase reconcile with rates of completion. Assuming that 
this is true, we can revisit the analysis shown in figure 1 and ask how might housing 
market outcomes be different if housebuilders face downward sloping, rather than 
horizontal, demand curves? The revised analysis is shown in figure 2. 
 
[Figure 2 goes here] 
 
In figure 2, I have redrawn the stock supply curve in panel (a) to demonstrate low 
price elasticity. Panel (b) represents the market for newly constructed dwellings. The 
x axes are not drawn to scale but we might assume that the stock price level, P1 
initially, suggests a horizontal demand curve faced by housing developers. This curve 
remains horizontal to a point, and we might think of this quantity demanded, QN1, as 
representing perhaps 10% of total (new and stock) transactions volume. Assume that 
newly constructed units of housing are a substitute for stock supply. Hence, if 
housing developers attempt to increase supply beyond QN1 then this requires 
successful marketing to consumers progressively less predisposed to new-build 
housing rather than second-hand alternatives. In effect, developers must mark down 
new housing relative to second-hand alternatives, and at an increasing rate beyond 
QN1. We can easily see that developers must sell at price P2n in order to increase their 
output from QN1 to QN2. An increase in stock demand for housing, shown as a shift 
from DS1 to DS2 in panel (a) increases the stock price level to P2. This higher price 
level implies a higher level of new housing output, but developers seeking to win a 
greater proportionate share of total housing transactions must again begin to move 
along the increasingly elastic portion of the demand curve for new housing, resulting 
in a decrease in new-build housing price to P4n. 
 
Assuming that this analysis holds, what are the implications for the level of new 
housing supply? The answer depends on the position of firms’ long-run cost curves. 
In panel (b) of figure 2, a marginal revenue curve is shown, drawn roughly in relation 
to demand curve DN1. Two possible locations for the firm’s long-run marginal cost 
curve are shown: LMC1 and LMC2. We can easily see, assuming the objective of the 
firm is profit maximisation, that LMC1 implies that firms are unable to move from SN1 
to SN2. However, LMC2 implies that excess profits are made at P1QN1 which makes it 
possible for the firm to shift supply from SN1 to the profit maximising SN2.  
 
The analysis above is entirely theoretical, and conjectural, being hitherto untested by 
empirical evidence. To state the second proposition more formally: 
 
Housing developers face downward sloping demand curves in local markets 
for new-build housing. 
 
5. Did planning for housing policy make a difference? 
 
As noted earlier in the paper, a significant and concerted programme of policy 
reform, informed by government commitment to research evidence, followed the 
Barker Review. The planning system was subjected to significant reform and directed 
towards a top down output orientated approach to housing supply (with initially 
national, followed by regional housing completions targets). Despite this, total 
housing completions rose relatively slowly, and at a far lower rate than required by 
government targets, as shown in figure 3. 
 
 [Figure 3 goes here] 
 
The rise in housing completions in England in the past 2004 period was not obviously  
higher than in the preceding 3 to 4 years. Bearing in mind that this period was also 
characterised by a rapidly rising housing market, in which housing developers would 
be expected to respond strongly to rising demand, this outcome is a little surprising. 
Even more noticeably, the same period witnessed a strong swing from lower density 
forms of housing, to higher density (flatted / apartment) developments. This can be 
seen in figure 4. 
 
[Figure 4 goes here] 
 
Thus, by around 2006 the evidence appeared to suggest that the substantial reforms 
of the planning system had led to a modest rise in housing completions overall, and a 
swing from low density developments with slower build rates, to higher density / 
higher build rate projects (see Adams et al, 2009). A number of commentators 
interpreted two further policy developments as evidence that housing policy makers 
remained dissatisfied with the response of the housing development industry to what 
government regarded as a substantially improved supply of housing development 
land. The Callcut Review and, at the time of its launch, the OFT housebuilding market 
study, appeared to move the focus of poor housing supply from the planning system 
to housing developers themselves. The Callcut Review was commissioned in 
December 2006, with a remit to examine, among other things: 
 
“…how the supply of new homes is influenced by the nature and structure of 
the housebuilding industry, its business models and its supply chain, including 
land, materials and skills…”. 
 
 In June 2007, the UK’s Office for Fair Trading (OFT) announced that they would 
undertake a market study focused on the housing development industry. The cited 
reasons for this launch included concern about: 
 
“…low supply response to sustained rising prices, low levels of quality and 
innovation.”  
 
The idea that housing developers have limited ability to substantially increase 
capacity found support from research carried out for the UK government’s 
department of Communities and Local Government, later reported by Adams et al 
(2009). The study focused on the apparently high incidence of developer-to-
developer land trading which, of course, represents a paradox in the context of very 
low land supply cited by developers as a reason for low supply response. The study 
presented qualitative evidence that housing developers, as individual firms, cannot 
easily respond to rising prices by boosting production output. Instead, they prefer to 
raise housing prices in response to rising demand, and to sell excess land that they 
consider ripe for development but for which they currently lack capacity to develop. 
 
5.1 Study approach: proposition one 
 
I test the first proposition set out in the previous by examining the nature of 
production technology, and the substitutability between land and non-land inputs to 
housing production, i.e. capital. In addition to being theoretically interesting, these 
questions are important with respect to housing policy – particularly in relation to the 
long debate over the importance of land supply to housing supply that played out 
between 2003 and the beginning of the global financial crisis. It is self-evident, for 
example, that if land is a poor substitute for non-land inputs then even a significant 
increase in land supply will lead to a relatively modest rise in new housing supply, and 
vice versa. 
 
I first estimate a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function: 
 
     /11 LKAH     (1) 
 










The first order conditions for profit maximisation are: 
 
   pRALH // /     (2) 
 




p unit price of H 
H capacity to produce housing services (homogeneous of degree one) 
L lot size 
K quantity of non-land inputs 
R unit price of land 
 
The empirical specification is derived from the solution for the two first-order profit 










  ln1lnln  (4) 
 


















   (5) 
 
The estimate of the first term can be used to calculate the elasticity of substitution 
which, as shown in the specification, varies with the ratio of land to non-land 
production inputs: 
 
     KL /1/11     (6) 
 
The hypothesis of variable elasticity of substitution is tested by estimating a Box-Cox 
transformation. The hypothesis under test, as noted above, is that the elasticity of 
substitution varies in relation to the ratio of land to non-land production inputs. 
 
The empirical work draws on data from a number of sources. It is primarily derived 
from a database of residential planning consents provided by Emap-Glenigan but it is 
important to note that a sub-sample, representing developments described as either 
in progress or for which detailed approval has been granted, was drawn. This was 
narrowed down further to ensure that each observed development had a complete 
record comprising proposed number of housing units, site area and construction 
contract value. The resulting dataset was then matched with data on the mean 
transaction price of bulk residential development land at local authority level, 
provided by the Valuation Office Agency1. Both datasets span the period 2004 
through 2008. Another set of company-specific variables was added. 
 
In addition to the basic variables described above, the dataset includes a set of flags 
denoting whether each development is for housing, ‘luxury housing’, apartments or 
bungalows. Student housing and retirement projects were excluded from the 
database prior to the analysis. Descriptive statistics are set out in appendix 1. 
 
5.2 Study approach: proposition two 
                                               
1 My thanks to Professor Craig Watkins, University of Sheffield, for facilitating access to this dataset 
 
The second proposition introduced in the previous section is really an extension of an 
argument first put forward by Adams et al (2009) that the ability of housing 
developers to sell their output at the price they expect depends, in part, on the 
extent of local competition from other housing developers. In Adams et al (2009) it is 
argued that developers may voluntarily regulate their output level to ensure that the 
price achieved on completed units at least matches assumptions made at an earlier 
period – when development appraisal calculations informed their financial offers for 
site acquisition. We can take this argument a step further by hypothesising that, 
other factors held constant, developers defer development on sites with planning 
permission when these sites are in proximity to other competing new-build sites. 
 
We test this by estimating a simple binomial logit model based on sites that receive 
planning permission and, in time, become active in the sense that a developer 
develops and sells housing in these locations. The modelling requires extensive 
analysis of two datasets merged using GIS methods. The first dataset contains 
information on residential planning consents in the UK between 1998 and 2008 and 
was supplied on license by Emap-Glenigan. This dataset makes it possible to identify 
the location of sites subject to detailed planning permission. A grid reference allows 
each site to be located in a GIS while a simple model of site area based on 
development design and size makes it possible, by assuming that every site is circular, 
to draw a radius around each of the developments identified in the planning 
permission database. The second dataset was supplied by Nationwide Building 
Society and includes information on 6,446 new-build housing transactions on which 
the Building Society provided a mortgage during the period 1998 through 2007. This 
dataset is used to identify approximately when each site in the planning database 
became active, if at all. 
 
In order to avoid an unnecessarily convoluted explanation, it should be sufficient to 
note the following: the first temporal appearance of a new-build transaction within a 
site (in the GIS planning permission database) is taken to signify that a site has 
become active. An active site is being defined here in the sense that a developer is 
building and selling homes in that location. A site is assumed to have become inactive 
once the completion date in the planning application database has passed. The truth 
of this was, of course, also checked in the hedonic dataset. This approach allows us to 
define a measure of competing local new-build alternatives as follows: 
 
= ∑     (7) 
 
Where, 
SIi Spatial interaction term relevant to the ith site 
sj Number of housing units being constructed on the jth active site, where 
active is defined as being developed with housing being sold at the time of 
the ith hedonic transaction 
dij Distance between the jth competing active site and the ith hedonic 
transaction 
 
The spatial interaction variable defined above then feeds into a model of the 
probability of each site in the planning permission database becoming active as time 
elapses from the point that planning permission is granted. Formally, the model is as 
follows: 
 
( ) = ( ⋯ )  (8) 
 
Where, 
P(π) Probability that a site with planning permission will become active in a given 
year 
X1 Spatial interaction term (measure of competing nearby sites) 
X2…n Other explanatory variables 
 
Although not shown in full in the equation, the model includes other explanatory 
variables including indicators of planning stance and the cost of borrowing, with 
more explanation and discussion of these variables and effects set out towards the 
end of the next section. 
 
 
6. Empirical results 
 
The first proposition is examined by estimating a series of equations beginning with 
equation (4). These estimates are shown in table 1 and refer to a constrained 
maximum likelihood estimation (the coefficients are constrained such that σ and (1- 
σ) sum to 1. This estimation is for the period 2004 through 2008. 
 
[Table 1 goes here] 
 
[Table 2 goes here] 
 
What is notable about the estimation results are that, first, the elasticity of 
substitution is much lower than reported in previous (US based) studies. For example, 
Thorsnes (1997) reports a range of 0.80 to 1.08. Although both coefficients are 
statistically significant, the explanatory power of the model is poor (with an adjusted 
R square of 0.10). The Box-Cox transformation results, summarised in table 2, fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of variable elasticity of substitution, i.e. λ is significantly 
different from zero. 
 
 
The poor explanatory power is not altogether surprising given that the estimation 
encompasses all local authority areas in England, and over a five year period. In 
addition, there are likely to be many unmeasured partial determinants of developers’ 
production decisions including planning controls and infrastructure constraints. Most 
previous studies have attempted the estimation of a production function within a 
single metropolitan area, justifying the removal of the construction cost parameter 
(eta). Despite extensive work undertaken to create a construction cost index that 
varies at local authority level, the variable is not truly a comprehensive 
representation of construction costs, as viewed by the firm, because no account is 
taken of the firm-specific cost of capital. In addition, while the equation includes 
mean residential development land prices at local authority level, there are inevitably 
variations within local authority areas. As discussed earlier in the paper, firms may 
interpret the opportunity cost of land differently depending on the extent of their 
land holdings and strategic holdings (land controlled through options). 
 
Table 3 summarises a disaggregated set of estimation results (by calendar year). The 
most interesting insight that arises from this set of results is that the elasticity of 
substitution rises during the study period. It appears to be relatively stable, at 
between 0.35 and 0.38 in 2004 through 2006, rising to between 0.42 and 0.52 in 
2007/2008. On the face of it, this is suggestive of changing production technology, 
and that land becomes more substitutable for capital later in the study period. 
 
[Table 3 goes here] 
 
The notion that developers may face more than one choice of production technology 
is supported by the results in table 4. This estimation adds a crude indicator of 
development type derived from the planning application data. Developments are 
assumed to be higher density (apartments) unless indicated otherwise by the 
‘housing’, ‘luxury housing’ and ‘bungalow’ dummy variables. A second variant of this 
model, shown in the last two columns of table 4, adds a set of planning stance 
indicators to the specification2. 
 
[Table 4 goes here] 
 
Adding three indicators of local authorities’ planning stance has the effect of slightly 
improving the explanatory power of the model. By ‘planning stance’, I refer to the 
degree to which local authorities are inherently favourable towards accomodating 
residential development. Reducing such a notion to a set of quantitative indicators is 
                                               
2 I am grateful to my colleague Glen Bramley for facilitating access to these indicators 
neither easy to do, nor defend. Clearly, planning stance is likely to depend in part on 
the size, urban/rural composition, density and broad location of a local authority, in 
addition to its political make-up – the aspect that has potential to help shape 
planning outcomes given the flexibility of the British planning system referred to 
earlier in the paper. A number of early model estimations, not reported here, 
experimented with a wider set of indicators including the length of time taken by 
planning authorities to reach development decisions, proportion of applications 
approved / rejected, proportion going to appeal, proportion being won on appeal, 
and so on. Either no statistical relationship, or else a very weak relationship, was 
found between the dependent variable and many of these indicators. The exceptions 
remain in the model summarised in the final two columns of table 4: the flow of 
planning consents per capita, the proportion of land area designated as green belt, 
and the proportion of new planning consents that relate to greenfield land. The first 
and last of these are both intended as indicators of positive planning stance, and the 
results suggest that land becomes more substitutable for capital as planning 
permissions become more abundant, and less so as the emphasis of planning 
permissions moves towards greenfield development. These observations, of course, 
make perfect sense. 
 
I now introduce a final variant of this particular model – one that reflects the notion 
put forward by Ball et al (2010), and carried forward in this paper, that firm-specific 
factors may be important determinants of developers’ decisions regarding how many 
housing units to supply to the market under different sets of economic conditions. 
The firm-specific indicators are derived from Wellings’ (2000 through 2006) annual 
handbook of housebuilding statistics. 
 
One consequence of including this additional set of predictors is that the time period 
covered by the analysis is reduced substantially3. The analysis is necessarily restricted 
to publicly listed companies. The resulting reduced dataset therefore covers the years 
2004 and 2005, and encompasses 408 developments undertaken by 29 different 
                                               
3 The last Wellings handbook was published in 2006, containing data relevant to the preceding calendar 
year 
firms. However, it is also worth noting that, taken together, these firms represent 
more than 50% of annual UK housing completions in the study period. 
 
[Table 5 goes here] 
 
The results shown in table 5 are for a parsimonious model, i.e. one that contains only 
statistically significant variables. In fact, only two of the new firm-specific variables 
were found to be statistically significant – annual completions and interest payments, 
expressed as a proportion of annual turnover. Some experimentation with other 
specifications considered a wider set of variables that also included firms’ land 
holdings, debt to net asset ratio and annual turnover. 
 
The results confirm the earlier finding that land is only weakly substitutable for 
capital. The addition of firm specific variables, and indicators of planning stance, 
increases the explanatory power of the model considerably (the adjusted R square 
rises to more than 0.40). Estimated parameters indicate that land is more readily 
substitutable for capital in local authorities with a higher rate of new planning 
consents, and less so in authorities with a higher proportion of greenfield sites and 
longer average planning decision times. Meanwhile, land is more substitutable for 
capital in relation to firms with higher volumes of annual completions, and 
significantly more so for those with relatively high exposure to debt (i.e. high annual 
interest payments as a proportion of turnover). This is particularly interesting given 
that, presumably, highly leveraged firms face higher costs of capital, but may 
nevertheless have significant land holdings. 
 
The final set of statistical results examined in this paper is intended to test 
Proposition Two put forward in section 5. Although constructing the dataset was an 
enormous undertaking, the econometric estimation of equation 8 can itself be 
summarised very simply. The coefficients set out in table 6 indicate the effect of each 
variable shown on the probability of a given site with planning permission becoming 
active (i.e. development commencing) in a given year. The spatial interaction term is 
the main variable of interest (shown on the first line in the table, below the 
constant). This variable is essentially an index of the quantity of nearby, competing 
development sites. As nearby sites become closer, or larger, the probability of a new 
development site becoming active then reduces. This is shown by the statistically 
significant, negatively signed coefficient. A contemporaneous version of this variable 
was not significant – neither were versions lagged 1 or 2 years – only the t-3 
specification shown in the table was found to be significant. 
 
Other results shown in table 6 indicate that high local authority level vacancy rates 
slow down development activity. To a lesser extent, stronger emphasis on apartment 
development also slows down activity. Another interesting finding is that high 
interest rates appear to accelerate the timing of sites with planning permission 
becoming active (development commencing). This is a plausible finding given that 
high interest rates imply a high holding cost for development land. Finally, there are 
statistically significant but very small effects of planning stance, private investment 
and deprivation variables. These variables are retained in the equation for 
econometric reasons but show such small effects that further discussion would be 
unwarranted. 
 




I hope that the most substantial contribution of this paper to knowledge will be a 
contribution to a re-shaped policy relevant research agenda that is mindful of the 
many microeconomic assumptions that have been made about housing developers 
and the development industry. Stronger planning regulations in the UK, compared 
with the U.S., have been put forward in the past as a partial explanation for the 
weaker responsivness of supply. Without doubting this logic entirely, there can be 
little doubt that the rise in new housing completions following the policy reforms of 
the Barker Review was weaker than that sought be policy makers. In this paper I have 
reflected on that outcome while developing what I hope will be seen as some novel 
ideas about the behaviour of housing developers in terms of their interactions with 
competititors, with the land market, and with housing consumers. The behaviour of 
developers in the land market has not been covered explicitly here, but I have 
commented on it elsewhere (see Adams et al, 2009), and it is clearly inadvisable to 
separate land market activities of developers from their interactions with 
competitors and with consumers. 
 
In addition to the novelty of the ideas put forward here, I would argue that the 
empirical results are at least suggestive that the microeconomics of the housing 
development industry deserve more attention than hitherto received in the 
literature. The results suggest that the substitutability of land for capital partly 
depends on factors such as the size of development company, and firm-specific cost 
of borrowing. This might very well matter to policy makers given that the size of 
firms, their financial organisation, and market concentration, vary substantially 
within a country or region. Although the time period examined by the analysis is very 
short, there is at least a suggestion that the substitutability of inputs to construction 
is not constant over time. Perhaps the most interesting empirical finding is of a 
statistically significant link between the timing of development, or the length of time 
that elapses after grant of planning permission, and the amount / extent of nearby 
new supply. As the number and/or volume of nearby competing developments rises, 
the probability that a site with planning permission commences development 
declines. Not surprisingly, local housing market contextual factors such as vacancy 
rates and deprivation also affect this relationship. Meanwhile, macro-economic 
factors such as the cost of borrowing are also important. Together, these findings 
demonstrate that developers’ decisions regarding which sites to purchase, when to 
apply for permission, when to commence development and how fast to supply 
completions to the market are very complex. The decisions involve interactions of 
macro factors, local housing market context, and micro-economics issues. The latter, 
in particular, have received insufficient attention by housing economists, and further 
work in this area may well be fruitful in developing our understanding of the 
interface between planning and local housing markets. 
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Table 1  Elasticity of substitution 
 Coefficient t P 
Constant 2.913 50.34 *** 
log unit land price 0.373 25.5 *** 
log unit construction 
cost 0.627 42.93 *** 









Lambda -0.146 -10.59 *** 
 
Tests of null  
Lambda= -1 RLL 3631.14 *** 
Lambda= +1 RLL 7316.45 *** 
 
 
Table 3  Elasticities of substitution within the study period 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Constant 1.493 2.541 3.119 3.657 0.499 
log unit land price 0.382 0.338 0.340 0.416 0.515 
log unit construction 
cost 0.961 0.796 0.638 0.342 0.911 
Adj R sq 0.196 0.161 0.139 0.1291 0.2016 
N 2346 2619 4627 1102 571 
 
 
Table 4  Elasticity of substitution with development type and planning 
proxies 
Variable Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 4.223 *** 5.42 *** 
log unit land price 0.102 *** 0.055 *** 
log unit construction cost 0.870 *** 0.769 *** 
2005 dummy 0.059 *** 0.051 *** 
Housing development -0.572 *** -0.506 *** 
Luxury housing development -0.696 *** -0.611 *** 
Bungalow development 0.814 *** 0.946 *** 
London dummy 0.424 *** 0.286 *** 
Flow of planning consents 0.02 *** 
LA area designated green belt -0.002 *** 
Proportion of consents greenfield -0.008 *** 
R bar sq 0.225 0.249 





Table 5  Elasticity of substitution with firm specific variables 
Variable Coefficient t statistic 
constant 4.745 6.53 *** 
log unit land price 0.24 5.66 *** 
log unit construction cost 0.50 3.43 *** 
Flow of planning consents 0.094 2.19 ** 
Proportion of consents greenfield -0.008 
-
5.64 *** 




Housing development -0.319 
-
6.94 *** 
Luxury housing development -0.489 
-
6.88 *** 
log firm annual completions 0.034 2.09 ** 
firm interest payments % turnover (t-
1) 0.972 5.37 *** 




Table 6  Spatial interaction model results 
Variable Coefficient 
Constant -3.78326 *** 
Sum of t-3 units ÷ distance -0.00207 *** 
Private housing vacancy rate -0.21991 *** 
Proportion of developments that are apartments -0.02055 *** 
Mortgage interest rates (t-1) 0.63228 *** 
Flow of land with planning permission (t-1) -0.00075 *** 
Stock of outstanding planning permissions (t-1) 0.00033 *** 
Investment flow to private rental sector (t-1) 0.02014 *** 
Index of multiple deprivation (income) (t-1) 0.03131 ** 
N 1459 
Groups 267 


















2004 site_area Mean 2.01 1.13 0.4 0.46 
St. Dev. (10.44) (1.36) (1.11) (0.18) 
units Mean 52.2 35.5 36.21 14.45 
St. Dev. (77.64) (45.39) (56.55) (3.36) 
k Mean 4393.01 2388.1 2035.61 930 
St. Dev. (19539.57) (3061.57) (4814.15) (297.32) 
2005 site_area Mean 1.62 1.11 0.39 0.58 
St. Dev. (3.9) (1.55) (0.75) (0.48) 
units Mean 51.88 33.48 37.95 24.3 
St. Dev. (80.37) (39.56) (69.68) (21.77) 
k Mean 4107.57 2453.27 2232.59 1766 
St. Dev. (10156.94) (2619.07) (6178.67) (1556.66) 
2006 site_area Mean 2.46 1.98 0.47 0.54 
St. Dev. (23.52) (3.78) (1.4) (0.3) 
units Mean 54.71 49.1 37.74 19.14 
St. Dev. (84.89) (88.99) (67.86) (10.4) 
k Mean 5049.84 3481.75 2748.97 1442.86 
St. Dev. (21601.18) (5787.94) (12342.85) (769.43) 
2007 site_area Mean 1.92 1.04 0.5 . 
St. Dev. (4.34) (0.71) (1.52) . 
units Mean 62.68 58.67 39.8 . 
St. Dev. (100.66) (65.8) (78.09) . 
k Mean 4815.29 4085 3021.53 . 
St. Dev. (11245.02) (4396.02) (10332.38) . 
2008 site_area Mean 1.91 2.85 0.69 . 
St. Dev. (4.25) (3.14) (1.71) . 
units Mean 56.16 80.5 47.1 . 
St. Dev. (85.04) (84.12) (91.78) . 
k Mean 5278.33 5600 6544.53 . 
St. Dev. (12346.78) (5738.18) (35943.28) . 
 
 
 
 
